

# IPSEC

IP security — security built into the IP layer

Provides host-to-host (or firewall-to-firewall) encryption and authentication

Required for IPv6, optional for IPv4

Comprised of two parts:

- IPSEC proper (authentication and encryption)
- IPSEC key management













#### Processing

Use SPI to look up security association (SA)

Perform authentication check using SA

Perform decryption of authenticated data using SA

Operates in two modes

- Transport mode (secure IP)
- Tunneling mode (secure IP inside standard IP)

# **IPSEC Key Management**

#### ISAKMP

• Internet Security Association and Key Management Protocol Oakley

• DH-based key management protocol

#### Photuris

• DH-based key management protocol

SKIP

• Sun's DH-based key management protocol

Protocols changed considerably over time, most borrowed ideas from each other

#### Photuris

Latin for "firefly", Firefly is the NSA's key exchange protocol for STU-III secure phones

Three-stage protocol

- 1. Exchange cookies
- 2. Use DH to establish a shared secret Agree on security parameters
- 3. Identify other party Authenticate data exchanged in steps 1 and 2
- n. Change session keys or update security parameters

Cookie based on IP address and port, stops flooding attacks

• Later adopted by other IPSEC key management protocols

#### SKIP

Each machine has a public DH value authenticated via

- X.509 certificates
- PGP certificates
- Secure DNS

Public DH value is used as an implicit shared key calculation parameter

- Shared key is used once to exchange encrypted session key
- Session key is used for further encryption/authentication

Clean-room non-US version developed by Sun partner in Moscow

• US government forced Sun to halt further work with non-US version

#### Oakley

Exchange messages containing any of

- Client/server cookies
- DH information
- Offered/chosen security parameters
- Client/server ID's

until both sides are satisfied

Oakley is extremely open-ended, with many variations possible

- Exact details of messages exchange depends on exchange requirements
  - Speed vs thoroughness
  - Identification vs anonymity
  - New session establishment vs rekey
  - DH exchange vs shared secrets vs PKC-based exchange

#### ISAKMP

NSA-designed protocol to exchange security parameters (but not establish keys)

- Protocol to establish, modify, and delete IPSEC security associations
- Provides a general framework for exchanging cookies, security parameters, and key management and identification information
- Exact details left to other protocols

#### Two phases

- 1. Establish secure, authenticated channel ("SA")
- 2. Negotiate security parameters ("KMP")

#### ISAKMP/Oakley

#### ISAKMP merged with Oakley

- ISAKMP provides the protocol framework
- Oakley provides the security mechanisms

Combined version clarifies both protocols, resolves ambiguities



ISAKMP/Oakley (ctd)				
Phase 2 example				
Client	Server			
Encrypted, MAC'd Client nonce Security parameters offered				
Encrypted, MAC'd Client nonce Server nonce				

#### SSL

Secure sockets layer — TCP/IP socket encryption Usually authenticates server using digital signature Can authenticate client, but this is never used Confidentiality protection via encryption Integrity protection via MAC's Provides end-to-end protection of communications sessions

#### History

SSLv1 designed by Netscape, broken by members of the audience while it was being presented

SSLv2 shipped with Navigator 1.0

Microsoft proposed PCT: PCT != SSL

SSLv3 was peer-reviewed, proposed for IETF standardisation

# SSL Handshake

- 1. Negotiate the cipher suite
- 2. Establish a shared session key
- 3. Authenticate the server (optional)
- 4. Authenticate the client (optional)
- 5. Authenticate previously exhanged data

Client	 Server

#### SSL Handshake (ctd)

Client hello:

- Client nonce
- Available cipher suites (eg RSA + RC4/40 + MD5)

Server hello:

- Server nonce
- Selected cipher suite

Server adapts to client capabilities

Optional certificate exchange to authenticate server/client

• In practice only server authentication is used

# SSL Handshake (ctd)

Client key exchange:

• RSA-encrypt( premaster secret )

Both sides:

• 48-byte master secret = hash( premaster + client-nonce + server-nonce )

Client/server change cipher spec:

• Switch to selected cipher suite and key

# SSL Handshake (ctd)

Client/server finished

• MAC of previously exchanged parameters (authenticates data from Hello and other exchanges)

Can reuse previous session data via session ID's in Hello

Can bootstrap weak crypto from strong crypto:

- Server has > 512 bit certificate
- Generates 512-bit temporary key
- Signs temporary key with > 512 bit certificate
- Uses temporary key for security



#### SSL Characteristics

Protects the session only

Designed for multiple protocols (HTTP, SMTP, NNTP, POP3, FTP) but only really used with HTTP

Compute-intensive:

- 3 CPU seconds on Sparc 10 with 1Kbit RSA key
- 200 MHz NT box allows about a dozen concurrent SSL handshakes
  - Use multiple servers
  - Use hardware SSL accelerators

Crippled crypto predominates

• Strong servers freely available (Apache), but most browsers US-sourced and crippled

#### Strong SSL Encryption

Most implementations based on SSLeay, http://www.ssleay.org/

#### Server

• Some variation of Apache + SSLeay

Browser

- Hacked US browser
- Non-US browser

SSL Proxy

• Strong encryption tunnel using SSL

#### Strong SSL Browsers Fortify, http://www.fortify.net/ Patches Netscape (any version) to do strong encryption Original: POLICY-BEGINS-HERE: Export policy Software-Version: Mozilla/4.0 512 MAX-GEN-KEY-BITS: PKCS12-DES-EDE3: false PKCS12-RC2-128: false false PKCS12-RC4-128: PKCS12-DES-56: false PKCS12-RC2-40: true PKCS12-RC4-40: true ... SSL3-RSA-WITH-RC4-128-MD5: conditional SSL3-RSA-WITH-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA: conditional ...

Strong SSL Browsers (ctd)				
Patched version				
POLICY-BEGINS-HERE:	Export policy			
Software-Version:	Mozilla/4.0			
MAX-GEN-KEY-BITS:	1024			
PKCS12-DES-EDE3:	true			
PKCS12-RC2-128:	true			
PKCS12-RC4-128:	true			
PKCS12-DES-56:	true			
PKCS12-RC2-40:	true			
PKCS12-RC4-40:	true			
SSL3-RSA-WITH-RC4-128-MD5:	true			
SSL3-RSA-WITH-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA:	true			

# Strong SSL Browsers (ctd) Opera, http://www.operasoftware.com/ Norwegian browser, uses SSLeay Cryptozilla, http://www.cryptozilla.org/ Based on open-source Netscape Strong crypto added within one day of release from the US Exported US-only versions, ftp://ftp.replay.com/pub/replay/pub/ Contains copies of most non-exportable software

#### Strong SSL Servers

Based on SSLeay + some variant of Apache Mostly Unix-only, some NT ports in progress SSL portion is somewhat painful to configure Howtos available on the net



#### SGC

Server Gated Cryptography Allows strong encryption on a per-server basis Available to "qualified financial institutions" Requires special SGC server certificate from Verisign Enables strong encryption for one server (www.bank.com)

SGC (ctd)	
Exportable SSL	
Client	Server
Hello	$\rightarrow \leftarrow$ Hello + certificate
SSL with SGC	
Hello	$\rightarrow \leftarrow$ Hello + SGC certificate

# TLS

Transport layer security

IETF-standardised evolution of SSLv3

- Non-patented technology
- Non-crippled crypto
- Updated for newer algorithms

Substantially similar to SSL

Not finalised yet, little implementation support

TLS standards work,

http://www.consensus.com/ietf-tls/

#### S-HTTP

Designed by Terisa in response to CommerceNet RFP, http://www.terisa.com/shttp/intro.html

Predates SSL and S/MIME

Security extension for HTTP (and only HTTP)

Document-based:

- (Pre-)signed documents
- Encrypted documents

Large range of algorithms and formats supported

Not supported by browsers (or much else)

#### SSH

Originally developed in 1995 as a secure replacement for rsh, rlogin, et al (ssh = secure shell), http://www.cs.hut.fi/ssh/

Also allows port forwarding (tunneling over SSH)

Built-in support for proxies/firewalls

Includes Zip-style compression

Originally implemented in Finland, available worldwide

SSH v2 submitted to IETF for standardisation

Can be up and running in minutes



• Short-term keys regenerated as a background task



Multiple authentication mechanisms

- Straight passwords (protected by SSH encryption)
- RSA-based authentication (client decrypts challenge from server, returns hash to server)
- Plug-in authentication mechanisms, eg SecurID

Developed outside US, crippled crypto not even considered:

- 1024 bit RSA long-term key
- 768 bit RSA short-term key (has to fit inside long-term key for double encryption)
- Triple DES session encryption (other ciphers available)

#### **SNMP** Security

General SNMP security model: Block it at the router

Authentication: hash( secret value + data )

Confidentiality: encrypt( data + hash )

Many devices are too limited to handle the security themselves

- Handled for them by an element manager
- Device talks to element manager via a single shared key

Users generally use a centralised enterprise manager to talk to element managers

• Enterprise manager is to users what element manager is to devices

# **Email Security**

"Why do we have to hide from the police, Daddy?" "Because we use PGP, son. They use S/MIME"

#### **Email Security**

Problems with using email for secure communications include

- Doesn't handle binary data
- Messages may be modified by the mail transport mechanism
  - Trailing spaces deleted
  - Tabs  $\leftrightarrow$  spaces
  - Character set conversion
  - Lines wrapper/truncated
- Message headers mutate considerably in transit

Data formats have to be carefully designed to avoid problems

# **Email Security Requirements**

Main requirements

- Confidentiality
- Authentication
- Integrity

Other requirements

- Non-repudiation
- Proof of submission
- Proof of delivery
- Anonymity
- Revocability
- Resistance to traffic analysis

Many of these are difficult or impossible to achieve



Security Mechanisms (ctd)					
Encrypted message					
Encr Message					
Usually implemented using public-key encryption					
PK-encr key Encr Message					
Mailing lists use one public-key encrypted header per					
recipient					
PK-encr keyPK-encr keyEncrMessage					
• Any of the corresponding private keys can decrypt the session key and therefore the message					



#### PEM

Privacy Enhanced Mail, 1987

Attempt to add security to SMTP (MIME didn't exist yet)

• Without MIME to help, this wasn't easy

Attempt to build a CA hierarchy along X.500 lines

• Without X.500 available, this wasn't easy

Solved the data formatting problem with base64 encoding

- Encode 3 binary bytes as 4 ASCII characters
- The same encoding was later used in PGP 2.x, MIME, ...





# PEM Protection Types (ctd)

#### ENCRYPTED

-----BEGIN PRIVACY-ENHANCED MESSAGE-----Proc-Type: 4,ENCRYPTED Content-Domain: RFC822 DEK-Info: DES-CBC,BFF968AA74691AC1 Originator-Certificate: MIIBITCCAScCAWUwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQECBQAwUTELMAkGAlUEBhMCVVMxIDAeBgNV ... 5XUXGx7qusDgHQGs7Jk9W8CWlfuSWUgN4w== Issuer-Certificate: MIIB3DCCAUgCAQowDQYJKoZIhvcNAQECBQAwTzELMAkGAlUEBhMCVVMxIDAeBgNV ... EREZd9++32ofGBIXaialnOgVUn00zSYgugiQ077nJLDUj0hQehCizEs5wUJ35a5h MIC-Info: RSA-MD5,RSA, UdFJR8u/TIGhfH65ieewe2l0W4tooa3vZCvVNGBZirf/7nrgzWDABz8w9NsXSexv AjRFbHoNPzBuxwmOAFeA0HJszL4yBvhG Continues

# DEDM Drotection Types (ctd) Continued Mccipient-ID-Asymmetric MrsC2AJB9NVBAYTAlVTMSAW19YDVQQKExdSU0E9RGF0YSBTZWN1cm10eSwgSw5j jcpMa0ca1UeCxMcQm0V0SAxMQ8wDQYDVQQLEwZOT1RBU1k=,66 Ky-Info: RSA O6S1ww9CTyHPtS3bMLD+L0hejdvX6Qv1HK2ds2sQPEaXhX8EhvVphHYTjwekdWv 7c23Jx2vTAh0YHMcqqCja== Qw1j/YJ2Uf5ng9yznPbtD0mYloSW1uV9FRYx+gzY+8iXd/NqrXHfi6/MhPfPF3d jiqCJAxv1d2xgqQimUzoS1a4r7kQQ5c/Iua4LqKeq3ciFzEv/MbZha== ----END PRIVACY-ENHANCED MESSAGE-----





# Why PEM Failed

Why the CA's failed

- The Internet uses email addresses, not X.500 names – Actually, noone uses X.500 names
- CA's for commercial organisations and universities can't meet the same requirements as government defence contractors for high-assurance CA's
  - Later versions of PEM added lower-assurance CA hierarchies to fix this
- CA hardware was always just a few months away - When it arrived, it was hideously expensive
- CA's job was made so onerous noone wanted it
  - Later versions made it easier

#### Why PEM Failed (ctd)

- Hierarchy enshrined the RSADSI monopoly
  - CA hardware acted as a billing mechanism for RSA signatures
  - People were reluctant to trust RSADSI (or any one party) with the security of the entire system

Why the message format failed

- The PEM format was ugly and intrusive
  - PEM's successors bundled everything into a single blob and tried to hide it somewhere out of the way
- The reqired X.500 support infrastructure never materialised
- RSA patent problems

Pieces of PEM live on in a few European initiatives

• MailTrusT, SecuDE, modified for MIME-like content types

#### PGP

Pretty Good Privacy

- Hastily released in June 1991 by Phil Zimmerman (PRZ) in response to S.266
- MD4 + RSA signatures and key exchange
- Bass-O-Matic encryption
- LZH data compression
- uuencoding ASCII armour
- Data format based on a 1986 paper by PRZ

PGP was immediately distributed worldwide via a Usenet post

#### PGP (ctd)

PGP 1.0 lead to an international effort to develope 2.0

- Bass-O-Matic was weak, replaced by the recently-developed IDEA
- MD4 " " " MD5
- LZH replaced by the newly-developed InfoZip (now zlib)
- uuencoding replaced with the then-new base64 encoding
- Ports for Unix, Amiga, Atari, VMS added
- Internationalisation support added

#### Legal Problems

PGP has been the centre of an ongoing legal dispute with RSADSI over patents

- RSADSI released the free RSAREF implementation for (noncommercial) PEM use
- PGP 2.6 was altered to use RSAREF in the US
- Commercial versions were sold by Viacrypt, who have an RSA license

Later versions deprecated RSA in favour of the nonpatented Elgamal

• Elgamal referred to in documentation as Diffie-Hellman for no known reason

#### **Government Problems**

In early 1993, someone apparently told US Customs that PRZ was exporting misappropriated crypto code

US Customs investigation escalated into a Federal Grand Jury (US Attorney) in September 1993

US government was pretty serious, eg:

26 February 1995: San Francisco Examiner and SF Chronicle publish an article criticising the governments stand on encryption and the PGP investigation

27 February 1995: Author of article subpoena'd to appear before the Grand Jury

Investigation dropped in January 1996 with no charges laid

#### PGP Message Formats

Unsecured

Compressed

Signed/clearsigned

Encrypted

+ optional encoding

General format

----BEGIN PGP message type----

-----END PGP message type-----

#### PGP Message Formats (ctd) Clearsigned message: ----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----We've got into Peters presentation. Yours is next. Resistance is useless. ----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----Version: 2.3 iQCVAgUBK9IAl2v14aSAK9PNAQEvxgQAoXrviAggvpVRDLWzCHbNQo6yHuNuj8my cvPx2zVkhHjzkfs51UW6z63rRwejvHxegV79EX4xzsssWUzbLvyQUkGS08Sz2Eq bLSuij9aFXalv5gJ4jB/hU40qvU617gKKrVgtLxEYpkvXFd+tFC4n9HovumvNRUc ve5zY8988pY= =NOcG -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----



# PGP Key Formats

Unlike PEM, PGP also defined public/private key formats

KeylD	
Public key	Key trust
UserID	UserID trust
Signature	Sig.trust
Signature	Sig.trust

- Key trust = how much the key is trusted to sign things (set by user)
- userID trust = how much the userID is trusted to belong to this key
- Signing trust = copy of the signing keys trust

PGP calculates userID trust = sum of signing trusts

#### PGP Trust

UserID trust = trust of binding between userID and key

Key trust = trust of key owner

Example: UserID = Politician

- UserID trust = High
- Key trust = Low

Trust levels

- Unknown
- None
- Casual
- Heavy-duty

#### PGP Trust (ctd) Trust levels are automatically computed by PGP Public key UserID Trust=High Signature Trust=Casual Signature Trust=Casual Signature Trust=Casual Signature Trust=Casual User can define the required trust levels (eg 3 casuals = 1 high)

#### PGP Trust (ctd)

In practice, the web of trust doesn't really deliver

• It can also be used hierarchically, like X.509

Each key can contain multiple userID's with their own trust levels

- userID = Peter Gutmann, trust = high
- userID = University Vice-Chancellor, trust = none

Keys are revoked with a signed revocation which PGP adds to the key

#### **PGP** Keyrings One or more keys stored together constitute a keyring Keys are looked up by • userID (free-form name) • keyID (64-bit value derived from the public key) Trust Key Trust Sig ┥ Trust ┥ Sig Trust Key Trust Sig Trust Key Trust The owners key is ultimately trusted and can convey this to other keys

#### Key Distribution

Key distribution doesn't rely on an existing infrastructure

- Email
- Personal contact
  - Keysigning services
- Mailed floppies

Verification by various out-of-band means (personal contact, phone, mail)

• PGP key fingerprint designed for this purpose

First-generation keyservers

• email/HTTP interface to PGP keyring

Second-generation keyservers

• LDAP kludged to handle PGP ID's

#### PGP Key Problems

KeyID is 64 least significant bits of public key

- Can construct keys with arbitrary ID's
- Allows signature spoofing

Key fingerprints can also be spoofed

#### Advantages of PGP over PEM

You can pick your own name(s)

You don't have to register with an authority

PGP requires no support infrastructure

The trust mechanism more closely matches real life

Certificate distribution can be manual or automatic (just include it with the message)

PGP is unique among email security protocols in having no crippled encryption

PGP's compression speeds up encryption and signing, reduces message overhead

# MIME-based Security

Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions

Provides a convenient mechanism for transferring composite data

Security-related information sent as sections of a multipart message

- multipart/signed
- multipart/encrypted

Binary data handled via base64 encoding

MIME-aware mailers can automatically process the security information (or at least hide it from the user)
# MIME-based Security (ctd)

General format:

Content-Type: multipart/type; boundary="Boundary"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64

--Boundary encryption info

--Boundary *message* 

--Boundary signature --Boundary--

Both PEM and PGP were adapted to fit into the MIME framework

# MOSS

MIME Object Security Services

- PEM shoehorned into MIME
- MOSS support added to MIME types via application/mosssignature and application/moss-keys

#### MOSS (ctd)

#### MOSS Signed

```
Content-Type: multipart/signed; protocol="application/moss-
signature"; micalg="rsa-md5"; boundary="Signed Message"
--Signed Message
Content-Type: text/plain
Support PGP: Show MOSS to your friends.
--Signed Message
Content-Type: application/moss-signature
Version: 5
Originator-ID:
jV2OfH+nnXHU8bnL8kPAad/mSQlTDZlbVuxvZAOVRZ5q5+Ejl5bQvqNeqOUNQjr6
EtE7K2QDeVMCyXsdJlA8fA==
MIC-Info: RSA-MD5,RSA,
UdFJR8u/TIGhfH65ieewe2lOW4tooa3vZCvVNGBZirf/7nrgzWDABz8w9NsXSexv
AjRFbHoNPzBuxwmOAFeAOHJszL4yBvhG
--Signed Message--
```

```
MOSS (ctd)
MOSS Encrypted
Content-Type: multipart/encrypted; protocol="application/moss-keys";
  boundary="Encrypted Message"
--Encrypted Message
Content-Type: application/moss-keys
Version: 5
DEK-Info: DES-CBC, BFF968AA74691AC1
Recipient-ID:
MFExCzAJBgNVBAYTAlVTMSAwHgYDVQQKExdSU0EgRGF0YSBTZWN1cml0eSwgSW5j
LjEPMA0GA1UECxMGQmV0YSAxMQ8wDQYDVQQLEwZOT1RBUlk=,66
Kev-Info: RSA,
 O6BS1ww9CTyHPtS3bMLD+L0hejdvX6Qv1HK2ds2sQPEaXhX8EhvVphHYTjwekdWv
 7x0Z3Jx2vTAhOYHMcqqCjA==
--Encrypted Message
Content-Type: application/octet-stream
qeWlj/YJ2Uf5ng9yznPbtD0mYloSwIuV9FRYx+gzY+8iXd/NQrXHfi6/MhPfPF3d
jIqCJAxvld2xgqQimUzoS1a4r7kQQ5c/Iua4LqKeq3ciFzEv/MbZhA==
--Encrypted Message--
```



## PGP/MIME (ctd)

#### PGP/MIME Signed:

```
Content-Type: multipart/signed; protocol="application/pgp-signature";
  micalg=pgp-md5; boundary=Signed
--Signed
Content-Type: text/plain
Our message format is uglier than your message format!
--Signed
Content-Type: application/pgp-signature
- ----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE-----
Version: 2.6.2
iQCVAwUBMJrRF2N9oWBghPDJAQE9UQQAtl7LuRVndBjrk4EqYBIb3h5QXIX/LC//
jJV5bNvkZIGPIcEmI5iFd9boEgvpirHtIREEqLQRkYNoBActFBZmh9GC3C041WGq
uMbrbxc+nIs1TIKlA08rVi9ig/2Yh7LFrK5Ein57U/W72vgSxLhe/zhdfolT9Brn
HOxEa44b+EI=
=ndaj
- ----END PGP MESSAGE-----
--Signed--
```



# MOSS and PGP/MIME MOSS never took off PGP/MIME never took off either

#### S/MIME

Originally based on proprietary RSADSI standards and MIME

- PKCS, Public Key Cryptography Standards
  - RC2, RC4 for data encryption
  - PKCS #1, RSA encryption, for key exchange
  - PKCS #7, cryptographic message syntax, for message formatting

Newer versions added non-proprietary and non-patented ciphers

# CMS

Cryptographic Message Syntax

• Type-and-value format

Content type
Content

Data content types

- Data
- Signed data
- Encrypted data (conventional encryption)
- Enveloped data (PKC-encrypted)
- Digested (hashed) data
- Authenticated (MAC'd) data





#### Signature Format

Signing certificate identifier

Authenticated attributes

Signature

Unauthenticated attributes

Authenticated attributes are signed along with the encapsulated content

- Signing time
- Signature type
  - "I agree completely"
  - "I agree in principle"
  - "I disagree but can't be bothered going into the details"
  - "A flunky handed me this to sign"

# Signature Format (ctd)

- Receipt request
- Security label
- Mailing list information

Unauthenticated attributes provide a means of adding further information without breaking the original signature

- Countersignature
  - Countersigns an existing signature
  - Signs signature on content rather than content itself, so other content doesn't have to be present
  - $\ Countersignatures \ can \ contain \ further \ countersignatures$

## Enveloped Data Format

Per-recipient information

Key management certificate

identifier

Encrypted session key

Newer versions add support for key agreement algorithms and previously distributed shared conventional keys

# $\text{CMS} \rightarrow \text{S/MIME}$

Wrap each individual CMS layer in MIME

 $base64 \ encode + wrap \ content$ 

Encode as CMS data

base64 encode + wrap content

Encode as CMS signed data

 $base 64\ encode + wrap\ content$ 

Encode as CMS enveloped data

base64 encode + wrap content

Result is 2:1 message expansion

# S/MIME Problems

Earlier versions used mostly crippled crypto

- Only way to interoperate was 40-bit RC2
  - RC2/40 is still the lowest-common-denominator default
  - User is given no warning of the use of crippled crypto
     Message forwarding may result in security downgrade
- S/MIME-cracking screen saver released in 1997, http://www.counterpane.com/smime.html
  - Performs optimised attack using RC2 key setup cycles
  - Looks for MIME header in decrypted data

Original S/MIME based on patented RSA and proprietary RC2, rejected by IETF as a standard

IETF developed S/MIME v3 using strong crypto and nonpatented, non-proprietary technology

#### MSP

Message Security Protocol, used in Defence Messaging System (DMS)

- X.400 message contains envelope + content
- MSP encapsulates X.400 content and adds security header



X.400 security required using (and trusting) X.400 MTA; MSP requires only trusted endpoints

• MSP later used with MIME

#### **MSP** Services

Services provided

- Authentication
- Integrity
- Confidentiality
- Non-repudiation of origin (via message signature)
- Non-repudiation of delivery (via signed receipts)

MSP also provides rule-based access control (RBAC) based on message sensitivity and classification levels of sender, receiver, and workstation

• Receiving MUA checks that the receiver and workstation are cleared for the messages security classification

#### **MSP** Certificates

MSP defines three X.509 certificate types

- Signature-only
- Encryption (key management) only
- Signature and encryption (two keys in one certificate)

Certificate also includes RBAC authorisations

# **MSP** Protection Types

**MSP** Signature

• MUA/MLA signs with signature-only certificate

Non-repudiation

• User signs with signature or dual-key certificate

Confidentiality, integrity, RBAC

• Encrypted with key management or dual-key certificate

Non-repudiation + confidentiality, integrity, RBAC

• Sign + encrypt using either signature and key management certificates or dual-key certificate

Any of the above can be combined with MSP signatures

# MSP Protection Types (ctd)

MSP signature covers MSP header and encapsulated content

• Mandatory for mailing lists

User signature covers encapsulated content and receipt request information



# MSP in Practice

MSP is heavily tied into Fortezza hardware

- DSA signatures
- KEA key management
- Skipjack encryption

MSP later kludged to work with MIME a la MOSS and PGP/MIME